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INTRODUCTION 
This Article explores some of the conceptual and operational 
difficulties related to measuring political risk and to international law’s 
arguably rather limited promise to provide meaningful protections against 
that risk.  Part I explores the concept of political risk, providing a working 
definition of “risk” and examining previous attempts to develop workable 
definitions of “political risk,” which theorists have yet to successfully 
define.  It examines evidence suggesting that, definitional issues aside, 
businesses only imperfectly attempt to assess political risk and discusses 
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why simple off-the-shelf indexes of political risk and political science 
indicators of “democracy” and “veto points” are of limited utility for 
measuring objective political risk.  Part II discusses international law as a 
potential mitigator of political risk.  It introduces bilateral investment 
treaties (BITs) as a major international law mechanism for reducing 
political risk, reviewing empirical studies of the correlation between BITs 
and foreign direct investment (FDI) inflows that have attempted to 
demonstrate that BITs reduce political risk and examining whether BITs 
are correlated with a prominent off-the-shelf indicator of political risk.  It 
then discusses certain weaknesses of BITs as mitigators of political risk, 
including their imperfect coverage, the high cost and uncertainty of BIT 
litigation, and the availability of alternative risk-reducing strategies that 
might be more effective. 
I. THE CONCEPT OF POLITICAL RISK 
A. A General Definition of Risk 
The standard definition of “risk” is relatively intuitive and easy to 
grasp.  Risk is typically defined as the probability that an event will 
happen, where the event will have adverse consequences (costs) for the 
relevant party.1  Risks may be thought of as greater when the product of 
probability and costs is higher and as lower when the product is lower.2  
The law review literature on risk sometimes emphasizes a conceptual 
distinction between risk and uncertainty, where uncertainty is characterized 
by a lack of knowledge of the true distribution of probabilities of the 
adverse event.3  But that conceptual distinction is not of much obvious 
utility in the present context, as the managers of international businesses 
will rarely if ever know the true distribution of probabilities, though they 
may be able to estimate or guess at those distributions with more or less 
accuracy or bias.4  Rather, to the extent that managers attempt to assess risk 
 
 1.  See EPHRAIM CLARK & BERNARD MAROIS, MANAGING RISK IN INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS: 
TECHNIQUES AND APPLICATIONS 34 (1996) (providing the typical definition of risk). 
 2.  Stanley Kaplan & B. John Garrick, On the Quantitative Definition of Risk, 1 RISK ANALYSIS 
11, 13 (1981).  Kaplan and Garrick note that this operationalization equates (misleadingly in their view) 
low-probability/high-cost events with high-probability/low-cost events.  Id. 
 3.  See Richard A. Posner, Behavioral Finance Before Kahneman, 44 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 1341, 
1345–46 (2013) (discussing the distinction between risk and uncertainty and citing the classical sources 
developing the distinction). 
 4.  See Alain Chevalier & Georges Hirsch, The Assessment of the Political Risk in the Investment 
Decision, 32 J. OPERATIONAL RES. SOC’Y 599, 606–07 (1981) (arguing that the distinction between 
uncertainty and risk is often irrelevant to political risk assessments, which are by necessity often based 
on subjective impressions and on data of “questionable” reliability and accuracy). 
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in a mathematical way, they will almost always be working in an 
environment characterized by significant uncertainty, though they may not 
have much appreciation of how uncertain their estimates or risk actually 
are. 
B. Defining and Assessing Political Risk (or Not) 
The question of which kinds of adverse events a party is interested in 
predicting can be approached at the ultra-micro level, by attempting to 
identify any possible adverse event related to a foreign investment that 
might impose a cost on a business operation.  For example, perhaps the 
company CEO will slip on a banana peel while touring the company 
subsidiary in Costa Rica, suffering major incapacitating injuries and setting 
off an internal power struggle that leads to investor worries about 
succession and causing a sharp drop in the company’s share price.  Because 
such speculative risks are more or less infinite, cataloging them, assigning 
reasonable probabilities to them, and then adjusting corporate behavior in 
response is an obviously impossible task.  Rather, corporate risk assessors 
are likely to proceed by placing various kinds of risk into conceptual 
categories, sorting (and discarding) risks based perhaps in part on their 
perceived importance (e.g., only trying to catalog risks that have a high 
probability of occurring or that would have major consequences if they 
were to occur) or on whether they are thought to share similar causes, to 
have similar adverse consequences, or to be amenable to similar 
compensating or mitigating behaviors.5 
The notion of “political risk” is probably one of the most important 
standard categories of international business-related risk.  While the history 
of thinking explicitly about political risk dates back to at least the 1950s, 
the 1970s were arguably the heyday of conceptual explorations, with a 
great many articles appearing in what was then a relatively new field of 
academic inquiry: “international business studies.”6  In those articles, 
authors argued that political risk was an important risk for foreign direct 
investors, especially in the developing world, and offered their own 
definitions of the concept and, sometimes, their own systems for evaluating 
 
 5.  See, e.g., Yadong Luo, Political Risk and Country Risk in International Business: Concepts 
and Measures, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS 740 (Alan M. Rugman ed., 
2d ed. 2009) (breaking business-relevant risk into various categories, including political risk, and sub-
categories, such as “ownership, operational, and transfer risk”). 
 6.  See generally Stephen J. Kobrin, Political Risk: A Review and Reconsideration, 10 J. INT’L 
BUS. STUD. 67 (1979) (providing citations to numerous political risk articles from the 1960s and 
1970s). 
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it.7  Probably not surprisingly, political risk emerged as a hot topic in an era 
characterized by spectacular expropriations of foreign-owned assets.8 
Perhaps the high point of conceptual explorations of political risk is 
Stephen Kobrin’s influential 1979 article “Political Risk: A Review and 
Reconsideration.”9  Kobrin reviewed the numerous existing studies, finding 
that authors adopt widely varying and often conceptually problematic 
definitions of political risk (or even fail to define it at all).10  One common 
approach he identified was to equate political risk with “governmental 
interference with business operations,” a definition, he points out, that has 
important normative implications about the proper role of government in 
managing and regulating business affairs.11  Another approach was to 
equate political risk with particular events deemed to be “political,” such as 
coups, civilian unrest, or specific acts like expropriation or the imposition 
of currency controls, that were presumed likely to negatively impact 
foreign direct investors.12  In either case, Kobrin viewed political risk as 
conceptually and operationally problematic.13  He even suggested doing 
away with the term completely, though he also offered his own preferred 
definition, which focuses on whether events “motivated by or [that] have as 
their objective the maintenance or modification of power or authority 
relationships at the governmental level . . . . will reduce returns to the point 
where the project would be no longer acceptable on the basis of ex ante 
criteria.”14 
A number of interesting implications arise from Kobrin’s article.  
First, political risk theorists do not agree on what the concept actually 
entails; moreover, their definitions are often relatively simplistic or even 
somewhat incoherent.  Second, devising a concept that is of obvious 
operational utility is difficult, even considering Kobrin’s preferred 
definition.  In part this is because assigning causality to events based on 
their motivation (as political) is difficult, especially as the role of 
government has expanded into all corners of the modern economy (a point 
 
 7.  Id. (reviewing various definitions and systems for defining and identifying political risk). 
 8.  See, e.g., THEODORE H. MORAN, MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS AND THE POLITICS OF 
DEPENDENCE: COPPER IN CHILE (1974) (analyzing Chile’s 1971 expropriation of foreign copper 
interests); Robin C. A. White, Expropriation of the Libyan Oil Concessions: Two Conflicting 
International Arbitrations, 30 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 1 (1981). 
 9.  See Kobrin, supra note 6. 
 10.  Id. at 67–69. 
 11.  Id. at 73. 
 12.  Id. at 67. 
 13.  Id. at 68. 
 14.  Id. at 77. 
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that Kobrin recognizes as well).15  But it is also because existing data, as 
well as the inherently multi-causal complexities of modern society, will 
often impede the calculation with any real accuracy of a probability that 
political event x will happen and if it happens that it will impose cost y on a 
certain project with probability z.  Perhaps reflecting these difficulties, 
Kobrin finds that companies do not really assess political risk with much 
regularity or sophistication.16 
C. Political Risk in Theory and Practice Today 
Very little progress has been made in the intervening years in either 
the conceptualization of political risk or the use of political risk assessment 
by businesses.17  A recent paper by Export Development Canada (EDC), a 
government provider of political risk insurance, provides a nice example of 
both trends.18 
EDC traces the intellectual history of political risk, identifying four 
“non-contiguous schools” of thought that, taken together, form a 
“disconnected” and “fragmented” discipline,19 so much so that one of these 
schools has “largely abandoned” its “quest for general theory and systemic 
explanations.”20  And while recent work in international relations on 
political instability has embraced general theory and systemic explanations, 
the focus of that work is largely on international security-type concerns 
about conflict management and not on political risk as specifically 
experienced or viewed by business.21  The result is that “there is neither a 
generally accepted definition of political risk nor any widely accepted 
methodologies to evaluate it.”22 
 
 15.  Id. at 69. 
 16.  Id. at 68 (“[M]ost managers’ understanding of the concept of political risk, their assessment 
and evaluation of politics, and the manner in which they integrate political information into decision 
making are all rather general, subjective, and superficial.”); see also id. at 74 (“[W]ith very few 
exceptions, . . . surveys report the absence of any formal or even rigorous and systematic assessment of 
political environments and their potential impact upon the firm.”). 
 17.  Witold J. Henisz & Bennet A. Zelner, Legitimacy, Interest Group Pressures, and Change in 
Emergent Institutions: The Case of Foreign Investors and Host Country Governments, 30 ACAD. 
MGMT. REV. 361, 361 (2005) (observing that “the literature has not yet met the challenge posed by 
Kobrin [in 1979] to identify ‘which events matter’ and how ‘environmental processes affect investor 
perceptions’” of political risk). 
 18.  See Derek Baas, Approaches and Challenges to Political Risk Assessment: The View from 
Export Development Canada, 12 RISK MGMT. 135 (2010). 
 19.  Id. at 136–37. 
 20.  Id. at 138. 
 21.  Id. 
 22.  Id. at 137; see also CLARK & MAROIS, supra note 1, at 53–54 (“[P]olitical risk has not 
received a clear-cut definition. . . .  In fact . . . there is no general agreement on exactly what political 
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What about the frequency of political risk assessment?  EDC confirms 
Kobrin’s earlier finding that “many businesspeople and their financial 
supporters tend to undertake political risk assessment (PRA) in a 
superficial, haphazard and subjective way.”23  It cites a study finding that 
84% of recently surveyed companies “do not formally integrate social and 
political risks into their investment decisions,” a situation that is “not 
new.”24  Perhaps the lack of systematic political risk assessment is not 
surprising.  The theoretical literature on decision-making suggests that 
rational risk assessment of “low-probability/high-consequence events”—
which undoubtedly include adverse political risk events like 
expropriation—is particularly “troublesome”25 because of such things as 
the “ambiguities associated with the chances of an event and/or its 
consequences,” the disjuncture between expert and non-expert perceptions 
of risk, and the individuals (who, of course, make up the corporation) who 
“do not have clear, stable preferences with respect to . . . risk.”26 
EDC itself serves as an important exception to the tendency of 
corporations not to conduct rigorous political risk assessments, though it is 
also an exception that nonetheless helps explain why the tendency exists.  
EDC provides insurance for foreign investment projects against loss 
resulting from expropriation, from political violence, and from foreign 
exchange or currency restrictions—three classic categories of political risk 
(though categories that are not obviously closely related conceptually).27  
By EDC’s account, it has spent years developing a sophisticated and 
complex evaluation scheme for each kind of risk at the country and project 
level.28  But despite that major effort, EDC sees major problems with its 
creation, most notably that its model is impossible to validate empirically 
due to the small number of adverse events that it has encountered (roughly 
100 projects funded, with “fewer than five” claims).29  The small-sample 
problem is endemic of risk analysis more generally,30 and it means that 
 
risk assessment is supposed to measure.”). 
 23.  Baas, supra note 18, at 136. 
 24.  Id. 
 25.  Howard Kunreuther, A Conceptual Framework for Managing Low-Probability Events, in 
SOCIAL THEORIES OF RISK 301, 308–09 (Sheldon Krimsky & Dominic Golding eds., 1992). 
 26.  Id. 
 27.  Baas, supra note 18, at 139. 
 28.  Id. at 141 (noting that its efforts at political risk assessment began in the early 1980s and 
continued until the 2000s). 
 29.  Id. at 158. 
 30.  See Harry Otway, Public Wisdom, Expert Fallibility: Toward a Contextual Theory of Risk, in 
SOCIAL THEORIES OF RISK, supra note 25, at 215, 221 (noting that the “only risks that can be 
‘measured’ are the relatively uninteresting ones for which there are statistical or epidemiological data,” 
YACKEE MACRO(DO NOT DELETE) 6/22/2014  8:14 PM 
2014] POLITICAL RISK AND INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW 483 
EDC is unable to calculate whether its model is “good” in the statistical 
sense of separating projects that should be funded from those that should 
not.  There is no reason to think that the empirical situation is different for 
other national providers of political risk insurance, for private providers, or 
for other kinds of businesses considering investing abroad. 
The EDC article illustrates another problem endemic to political risk 
assessment: the fact that the domestic and international political 
environments are constantly changing in complex ways, such that a model 
that accurately predicts political risk in one era may be quite inadequate at 
predicting political risk in the current era.  The article discusses the 
example of the emergence of a global environmental movement, which has 
increased pressure on previously reliable national governments to abandon 
support for projects that the movement deems (genuinely or for strategic 
reasons) environmentally problematic.31  EDC’s model was simply not 
constructed to take into account the growing influence of the global 
environmental movement on national policies.32 
D. Off-the-Shelf Indicators of Political Risk 
It seems unlikely that many businesses thinking of investing abroad 
would first invest in a system of political risk analysis as sophisticated as 
EDC’s.33  Yet it seems that many businesspeople do assert that political 
risk is a major concern.34  Assuming that they in fact think that it is 
important and that they act on that perception at least to some extent, how 
might they go about assessing it on the cheap?35 
There are a variety of single-number ratings of various kinds of 
political risk to which businesspeople might turn to get a sense of whether a 
particular investment opportunity is politically risky.  For-profit companies 
 
whereas most risks of interest address “‘trans-scientific’ problems, those for which the methods of 
science can, in theory, provide answers but which, in practice, because of sample-size constraints, 
cannot be answered”). 
 31.  Baas, supra note 18, at 158. 
 32.  Id. 
 33.  See Chevalier & Hirsch, supra note 4, at 607 (“[A]ny sophisticated methodology [for 
assessing political risk] is irrelevant [to actual decisions to invest abroad] as it would be inconsistent 
with the subjective character and the limited information which is typical of such decisions.”).  
Chevalier and Hirsch nonetheless propose in broad form such a methodology, though they warn that 
“the information available to the analyst [to implement the methodology] is limited.”  Id. at 609. 
 34.  Kobrin, supra note 6, at 74. 
 35.  While my discussion below focuses on off-the-shelf quantitative indicators of political risk, 
businesses can certainly attempt to implement their own, more complex systems of political risk 
analysis, which may incorporate such indicators.  For a review of the main approaches to political risk 
assessment that notes significant flaws in each approach, see CLARK & MAROIS, supra note 1, at 69–
100. 
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like the PRS Group or BERI market political risk analysis services, 
prominent components of which are indexes purporting to measure on an 
ordinal scale whether a country is risky along a particular dimension.  For 
example, the PRS Group’s International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) 
calculates numerical scores for such things as “government stability,” 
“socioeconomic conditions,” “investment profile,” and “religious tensions” 
and weights and combines the scores into a single 100-point “political risk 
rating.”36  The rating can be used to determine, for instance, that the United 
States is marginally less politically risky (as ICRG defines things) than the 
UK and is significantly less politically risky than the Democratic Republic 
of Congo.  The ICRG’s quantitative evaluations are performed in-house by 
staff and are based on political information and financial and economic 
data, though the ICRG gives no real sense of what data its staff uses or how 
it transforms that data into index ratings.37  BERI’s approach is similar.  It 
too creates an index of political risk, but it relies on panels of outside 
experts (“senior bank, company, and government officials”).38  As 
additional value added, both companies provide qualitative country guides, 
and BERI’s even state whether the “business environment” in each country 
“merits investment, contracts for medium and long-term relationships, 
transaction-by-transaction trade, or no business relations.”39 
But while ratings like those provided by the PRS Group and BERI 
may provide a comforting basis for corporate decision-making, such ratings 
suffer from a number of important limitations.  Most obviously and also 
perhaps most importantly, they provide country-level ratings, not estimates 
of firm- or project-level risk.  This distinction is critical, as there is good 
reason to believe that actual political risk will vary, perhaps tremendously, 
depending on firm- and project-level characteristics.  Take a simple 
example: a proposed investment in a new nuclear power generation facility 
in the United States.  The United States is a highly-rated (low-risk) country, 
but the risk of a permit being denied for such a project is probably quite 
high.  To say that the United States is characterized generally by a low 
level of political risk reveals very little about whether investing in the U.S. 
nuclear energy sector is politically risky. 
Additionally, conceptions of political risk often reflect, at least 
implicitly, the theory of the “obsolescing bargain” between states and 
 
 36.  PRS GRP., INTERNATIONAL COUNTRY RISK GUIDE METHODOLOGY (2012), available at 
http://www.prsgroup.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/11/icrgmethodology.pdf. 
 37.  Id. 
 38.  BRS, BUS. ENV’T RISK INTELLIGENCE, http://www.beri.com/Publications/BRS.aspx (last 
visited Feb. 21, 2014). 
 39.  PRS GRP., supra note 36; BRS, supra note 38. 
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investors, in which state incentives to expropriate or otherwise interfere 
with investments tend to increase over the life of the investment.40  But that 
theory actually suggests that the risk of obsolescing bargains depends on 
the degree to which the investment’s assets are fixed.  The implication is 
that certain sectors (those characterized by a high degree of asset 
specificity, such as, arguably, hard-rock mining) may be more susceptible 
to the obsolescing bargain than sectors, such as light manufacturing, in 
which the real assets (such as access to international distribution networks 
or to high-level technical knowledge) are easy to either move out of the 
host country or deny to the state expropriator’s new management. 
Off-the-shelf indicators of political risk also often do not measure risk 
as typically defined.  Recall the general definition: a probabilistic chance of 
the occurrence of an event having adverse effects of a particular magnitude 
on the relevant party.41  The PRS Group’s ICRG index of political risk 
measures such things as a country’s “socioeconomic conditions,” including 
the unemployment rate, consumer confidence, and poverty, which are 
combined into a 12-point scale that is further combined with other variables 
into the ultimate 100-point scale.42  While socioeconomic factors may 
indeed be relevant to international businesspeople and may impact the 
profitability of the foreign operation, the unemployment rate (to take one of 
the three) is simply not a risk.  It is a socioeconomic fact (subject, of 
course, to measurement error) that may be relevant to a true risk 
assessment.  By itself or combined in a 12-point scale with other 
socioeconomic statistics, it is hardly an estimate of a probability of some 
adverse event.  Rather, the 12-point scale represents an unformulated 
theory about the potential impact of socioeconomic conditions on the 
probabilities of business-relevant adverse events.  Socioeconomic factors 
may in some sense be a proxy for an actual measurement of risk, but they 
are, by themselves, not risk.  To be useful as risk indicators they must still 
be transformed into actual probabilities of adverse events of particular 
magnitudes by the end user of the data.  This is no small task, to be sure.  
The relevance of, for instance, unemployment to the risk of an 
uncompensated expropriation in a certain sector of the economy is a 
 
 40.  See, e.g., Baas, supra note 18, at 147 (noting that EDC says that its assessment methodology 
reflects the obsolescing bargain notion); CLARK & MAROIS, supra note 1, at 85 (discussing an element 
of obsolescing bargain theory, emphasizing in particular the relative bargaining power of the host state 
and investor).  In addition to bargaining power, Clark and Marois also focus on “the strategic dimension 
of the investment” and “the foreign firm’s relation with the host country.”  Id. at 85.  Those variables 
reemphasize the project- and firm-specific nature of political risk. 
 41.  See discussion supra Part I.B. 
 42.  PRS GRP., supra note 36, at 3. 
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question on which there is, almost certainly, no relevant data. 
In risk forecaster Credit Risk International’s (CRI) system, there are 
four indexes of various kinds of business-related risk, each based on a large 
number of criteria and sub-criteria (100 in all).43  Its “business 
environment” index evaluates three major criteria (“management of the 
economy,” “foreign investment climate,” and “working conditions”), each 
of which is measured by an evaluation of numerous sub-criteria.44  In the 
case of “foreign investment climate,” CRI includes such variables as the 
“cost of energy,” the “price level of local real estate,” and “legal 
restrictions to capital flows” (among seven other variables, all with 
arbitrary weights).45  Again, while such variables may be relevant to a 
theory of political risk (or perhaps serve as reasonable proxies or predictors 
of risk, at least when included in an empirically verified model), they are 
not measurements of risk itself.  Indeed, many of CRI’s variables are 
statistical facts—the price level of local real estate is something eminently 
knowable, as is whether a country limits capital flows—and thus they 
represent the certainty, not the probability, of some state of the world.  
Furthermore, the state of the world represented by these variables is never 
linked theoretically or empirically to a business-relevant adverse event.  
For example, if the probability of expropriation is the risk about which a 
party is worried, do high real estate prices really mean that a foreign 
business is more likely to be expropriated? 
Off-the-shelf quantitative indicators of political risk thus leave a huge 
amount of work for the end user to complete in order to conduct an actual 
risk assessment.46  Quantitative indicators of risk must be turned into risk 
measures by linking the indicator to the probability of some particular 
adverse event by way of (hopefully empirically validated) causal theory.  
The end user must specify the theory, keeping in mind the specific event 
being predicted, and use the theory to assign probabilities both to the 
occurrence of the event and to different magnitudes of adverse impact that 
may result from the event.  While a businessperson could obviously use an 
off-the-shelf indicator for something without doing this extra work, that use 
 
 43.  CLARK & MAROIS, supra note 1, at 70. 
 44.  Id. 
 45.  Id. 
 46.  See John Hood & M. Shahid Nawaz, Political Risk Exposure and Management in Multi-
national Companies: Is There a Role for the Corporate Risk Manager?, 6 RISK MGMT. 7, 10 (2004) 
(“[F]or many MNCs possession of the information on the existence of political risk [as measured by 
readily available indicators] will not solve the key problems for them, ie how do they measure its likely 
impact on them, and subsequently manage this [impact]? . . .  What much of the literature [on political 
risk] remains silent on . . . is how MNCs operationalise this information into their risk management 
strategy.”). 
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would not be a political risk assessment in any meaningful sense. 
As seen above, even quite sophisticated political risk actors like EDC 
admit that their political risk models are resistant to statistical validation.47  
EDC emphasizes the small-sample problem: it is interested in measuring 
the probability of a particular adverse event, a claim against an insurance 
policy, but such claims are relatively rare.48  Other indicators of political 
risk, like the PRS Group’s, also suffer from validation problems for two 
reasons.  First, the specific adverse events that the indicator is supposed to 
predict are typically unclear.  Is PRS Group’s indicator successful if it 
reliably predicts instances of expropriation?  Of expropriation and 
nationalization?  Of the imposition of exchange controls?  Of a host state 
government’s failure to provide the investor with “full protection and 
security” against insurgent attacks?  Of its failure to treat the investor 
“fairly and equitably”?  Without a clear definition of political risk (or of the 
specific adverse events that parties are trying to predict), designing a 
validation test for a political risk indicator is impossible simply because the 
dependent variable is unclear. 
Even where parties can agree on the adverse event that is to be 
predicted, in most cases they will find it difficult to identify incidences of 
those events.  Take the simplest event that can be reasonably characterized 
as representing political risk, the probability of classic expropriation: the 
seizure of an investor’s property by the host state without adequate 
compensation.  While incidences of expropriation are in theory relatively 
visible (and thus measurable), expropriation has become much less 
common in recent years than it was in the 1970s.49  The small sample 
problem is debilitating.  If there are few or no incidences of expropriation, 
validating a model of the determinants of expropriation (or whether, for 
example, the PRS Group’s political risk index is a good predictor of 
expropriation) is impossible. 
Of course, other relevant adverse events may be more common than 
expropriation, but they may also be much more difficult to observe.  For 
instance, some scholars suggest that even though most states today have no 
interest in engaging in classic expropriation, they nonetheless still engage 
in, and perhaps are increasingly engaged in, “creeping expropriation” (or 
 
 47.  See supra notes 29–30 and accompanying text. 
 48.  See supra notes 29–30 and accompanying text. 
 49.  See Michael S. Minor, The Demise of Expropriation as an Instrument of LDC Policy, 1980–
1992, 25 J. INT’L BUS. STUD. 177, 180 (1994) (listing annual acts of expropriation from 1860–1992).  
On the other hand, a number of recent expropriations in Latin America hint at a reversal of this trend.  
See Yessika Monagas, U.S. Property in Jeopardy: Latin American Expropriations of U.S. 
Corporations’ Property Abroad, 34 HOUS. J. INT’L L. 455, 456–68 (2012). 
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“regulatory expropriation”), in which the tools of government are used to 
nibble away at the value of a foreign investment over time, accomplishing 
over the long run an effective taking of the investor’s property.50  The line 
between legitimate government regulation and impermissible “creeping 
expropriation” is blurry, making it difficult to build a database of 
incidences of “creeping expropriation.”  In fact, building such a database 
may be impossible, as indicated by the fact that, to the author’s knowledge, 
such a database has never been built—surprisingly so, given suggestions in 
the academic literature that “creeping expropriation” is a major source of 
modern political risk.51  And if measuring incidences of creeping 
expropriation is impossible, then so is validating models that are supposed 
to predict it. 
E. Social Scientific Measures of Political Risk Based on Democracy and 
Veto Points 
Parties can attempt to validate measures of risk indirectly by 
examining, for example, whether a particular indicator is associated not 
with the adverse event itself but with investment decisions.  This is the 
strategy pursued recently by various social scientists interested in exploring 
how political institutions might impact political risk.  Political scientist 
Nathan Jensen, for example, argues that democratic institutions make 
countries less risky, where risk is defined as the probability of changes in 
government policy.52  He argues that democracies, compared to 
autocracies, have more “veto” points, or opportunities for actors to block 
policy changes that they do not support and that investors presumably value 
 
 50.  Andrew T. Guzman, Why LDCs Sign Treaties That Hurt Them: Explaining the Popularity of 
Bilateral Investment Treaties, 38 VA. J. INT’L L. 639, 664 (1998) (“Because the costs of outright 
expropriation are likely to be high, the more moderate course of extracting value from the firm without 
forcing divestment . . . may be attractive.  This can be done in a wide variety of ways, including 
changing the tax rate, restricting the repatriation of profits, imposing new labor or local content 
requirements, and so on.  This approach, which is sometimes called ‘creeping expropriation,’ allows the 
country to take advantage of the existing management and their skills, thus avoiding the major costs of 
an outright expropriation, while still extracting value from the enterprise.  Creeping expropriation may 
also be preferred because it is less likely to provoke significant sanctions by the home country of the 
investor.  After all, the firm’s assets have not been seized and it is often difficult to identify where the 
right of a government to set policy crosses over into unreasonable conduct.” (footnote omitted)). 
 51.  See, e.g., Shain Corey, Note, But Is It Just? The Inability for Current Adjudicatory Standards 
to Provide “Just Compensation” for Creeping Expropriations, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 973, 976 (2012) 
(“[T]here has recently been a large increase in the number of indirect expropriations, particularly 
creeping expropriations.”).  Corey does not cite any empirical evidence that this is indeed the case, 
however. 
 52.  Nathan M. Jensen, Democratic Governance and Multinational Corporations: Political 
Regimes and Inflows of Foreign Direct Investment, 57 INT’L ORG. 587, 592 (2003). 
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the policy stability that results.53  Jensen tests his theory by examining 
whether democracies are more successful than autocracies at attracting 
foreign investment.54  He finds that they are, suggesting that democracies 
are indeed less risky.55 
Business professor Witold Henisz offers his own version of this thesis, 
though rather than focus on off-the-shelf indicators of democracy, as does 
Jensen, Henisz constructs a bespoke database of veto points for a large 
number of country-years.56  While Henisz does not examine whether his 
veto points measure is correlated with FDI flows, he does report 
correlations with economic growth57 and foreign investor mode of entry.58  
Those results suggest that his measure of political risk may reflect foreign 
investor considerations of whether or how to invest in a particular host 
state. 
While such studies are of significant intellectual interest, they suffer 
from certain limitations as validations of theories of political risk.  In part 
this is because they fail to measure what might be called “objective” risk.  
By focusing on investor behavior (whether investors are more likely to 
invest), the studies can at best shed light on whether investors subjectively 
view countries as politically risky or not.  Imagine, for example, that 
investors actually do accord democracy a prominent place in their 
investment decision-making process.  And imagine that they do so because 
they view democracy as a good indicator of political risk.  An empirical 
study on whether investors are more likely to invest in democracies will, 
unsurprisingly, discover a correlation, but that correlation suggests only 
that investors think democracy is a good indicator of political risk, not that 
it actually is a good indicator.59  Given convincing evidence that companies 
perform political risk assessments haphazardly and sloppily, there would 
not seem to be much good reason to think that a company’s own use of a 
particular indicator (e.g., democracy) is reliable evidence that the indicator 
 
 53.  Id. at 594. 
 54.  Id. at 596–97. 
 55.  Id. at 601 (“The empirical results . . . provide solid evidence of the positive effect of 
democracy on FDI inflows.”). 
 56.  Witold J. Henisz, The Institutional Environment for Economic Growth, 12 ECON. & POL. 1 4–
11 (2000) [hereinafter The Institutional Environment for Economic Growth]; Witold J. Henisz, The 
Institutional Environment for Multinational Investment, 16 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 334, 346–47 (2000) 
[hereinafter The Institutional Environment for Multinational Investment]. 
 57.  The Institutional Environment for Economic Growth, supra note 56, at 22–23. 
 58.  The Institutional Environment for Multinational Investment, supra note 56, at 350–60. 
 59.  Alternatively, a correlation between democracy and foreign investment decisions could 
indicate that democracy is a proxy for some variable or indicator other than democracy that investors 
actually do assess and use as a basis for decision-making. 
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is actually of much use in objectively predicting adverse events. 
Whether businesses in fact rely on such indicators naively (e.g. simply 
as rough measures of “good” and “bad” places to invest) or whether they 
rely on them as indicators of political risk, understanding the concept with 
a more sophisticated degree of theoretical coherence and specificity, is also 
unclear.  Neither Jensen nor Henisz provide really convincing evidence that 
they use them at all.  The problem seems particularly relevant to Henisz’s 
indicator.  Decent measures of democracy have been available since the 
1980s, making it at least possible that companies had access to the data and 
could have used it as a political risk indicator if they wished.  In contrast, 
Henisz’s veto points measure did not exist until Henisz invented and 
publicized it in the late 1990s and early 2000s.  Given the measure’s 
computational complexity, it is very unlikely that companies previously 
compiled their own, similar measure of veto points for the purposes of 
political risk assessment.  In other words, Henisz’s measure of veto points 
is a reliable indicator of how businesses conceive of and assess political 
risk only if businesses actually use a veto points measure (or if the veto 
points measure is somehow correlated with those conceptions and 
assessments).  But because such a measure did not exist until Henisz’s 
work, it seems highly unlikely that businesses actually made investment 
decisions on the basis of the concept prior to Henisz’s development of it.  
To the extent that Henisz is successful at marketing his indicator as useful 
for predicting political risk, businesses may in fact start to use it as such.  
But their use of it does not demonstrate that the indicator is in fact useful 
for predicting political risk.  Validating Henisz’s measure poses the same 
difficulties faced by EDC and other developers of political risk indicators, 
as discussed above. 
Finally, the veto points notion potentially suffers from a conceptual 
bias similar to the ideological bias against government intervention in the 
market that Kobrin identified many years ago.  In particular, the veto points 
notion seems to presume that changes in policy are necessarily adverse 
events and thus that businesses strongly desire policy stability.60  But policy 
changes, like revolutions, can herald profits as well as losses.  The policy 
 
 60.  See, e.g., Kirt C. Butler & Domingo Castelo Joaquin, A Note on Political Risk and the 
Required Return on Foreign Direct Investment, 29 J. INT’L BUS. STUD. 599, 600 (1998) (“Political risk 
is often defined as the risk of adverse consequences arising from political events. . . .  However, a 
definition of political risk that focuses only on negative outcomes is inadequate in identifying the 
impact of political risk on the firm’s cost of capital.  For this purpose, we need a definition of political 
risk that captures both positive and negative consequences of political events.”); Hood & Nawaz, supra 
note 46, at 9 (“A further complication in the definition of political risk is that most approaches are 
predicated on the notion that such risk is invariably negative.  Such approaches fail to recognise that 
political developments can have a positive effect on MNCs.”). 
YACKEE MACRO(DO NOT DELETE) 6/22/2014  8:14 PM 
2014] POLITICAL RISK AND INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW 491 
environment may, in its current state, be quite undesirable from a corporate 
perspective: perhaps tax rates are high, or perhaps an economic sector is 
closed to foreign participation.  Change in undesirable policy toward lower 
tax rates or allowing foreign participation will be viewed by the foreign 
investor as a good thing.  Veto points decrease the probability of “bad” 
policy changes but also of “good” ones too. 
II. INTERNATIONAL LAW AS A POTENTIAL MITIGATOR OF 
POLITICAL RISK 
A. An Introduction to BITs 
Discussions about the benefits of the rule of law often suggest that it 
helps to promote predictability by limiting the ability of government actors 
to act arbitrarily.61  In other words, law can reduce risk by promoting 
certainty about the future state of the world through the constraint of 
governmental discretion.  In a political system subjected to the rule of law, 
government actors will predictably act as the law requires them to act and 
not as they unpredictably may wish to act. 
From that theoretical starting point, it is easy to imagine that law, or 
even international law (despite its well-known limitations, particularly the 
lack of an effective enforcement mechanism), might be useful for reducing 
the political risks that beset the foreign direct investor.  International law’s 
traditional weakness has been somewhat overcome in the world of 
international investment law through the device of bilateral investment 
treaties . 
BITs provide investors with a package of substantive rights, such as 
the rights to national and most-favored-nation treatment, to be treated 
“fairly and equitably,” to freely transfer assets and proceeds out of the host 
state, and to be free from inadequately compensated expropriation.62  These 
substantive rights are coupled with the procedural right of guaranteed 
investor access to international arbitration in cases in which the investor 
believes that the host state has violated the terms of the treaty.63  The 
history of BITs has been told in a number of other articles.64  Here, it 
 
 61.  See, e.g., Benjamin K. Guthrie, Beyond Investment Protection: An Examination of the 
Potential Influence of Investment Treaties on Domestic Rule of Law, 45 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 1151, 
1159–60 (2013). 
 62.  See Jason Webb Yackee, Conceptual Difficulties in the Empirical Study of Bilateral 
Investment Treaties, 33 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 405, 416–17 (2008) (providing an overview of BITs). 
 63.  Id. 
 64.  For good historical, doctrinal, and theoretical overviews of BITs, see generally United 
Nations Conference on Trade and Development [UNCTAD], Bilateral Investment Treaties: 1959–1999, 
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suffices to say that BITs have proven to be enormously popular: thousands 
have been signed in the past 30 or so years.65  They have also proven 
somewhat controversial, as investors are increasingly using them in 
creative ways to sue governments for alleged misdeeds that, in an era 
before BITs, would have been unactionable at law, domestic or 
international.66 
The popularity of BITs may be premised on their ability (assumed or 
actual) to protect investors against political risk, however defined.  For 
example, less-developed countries (LDCs) may be motivated to sign BITs 
because they make investors more likely to invest by ensuring that host 
state “promises” to investors will be kept.67  The problem of host state 
promise-keeping can be viewed as one of political risk. 
B. Empirical Studies of BITs and Foreign Investment Flows 
The basic idea that BITs may promote foreign investment by using 
law to reduce political risk has motivated a number of empirical studies of 
whether BITs are actually effective at doing so.  These studies typically use 
econometric techniques to identify statistically significant correlations 
between the number of BITs that a host state has signed and the amount of 
FDI that the host state receives.68  If more BITs are associated with more 
FDI, it can be inferred that investors view the treaties as being effective at 
reducing investment-inhibiting political risk. 
In fact, the empirical results are inconclusive.  Some empirical studies 
find that BITs are associated with large increases in FDI, suggesting that 
the treaties are very effective reducers of risk.69  Other empirical studies 
find no effect or only modest effects.70  There is not a firm empirical basis 
 
UNCTAD Doc. UNCTAD/ITE/IIA/2 (2000), available at http://unctad.org/en/docs/poiteiiad2.en.pdf; 
KENNETH  J. VANDEVELDE, BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATIES: HISTORY, POLICY, AND 
INTERPRETATION (2010); Kenneth J. Vandevelde, A Brief History of International Investment 
Agreements, 12 U.C. DAVIS J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 157 (2005). 
 65.  Anna T. Katselas, Do Investment Treaties Prescribe a Deferential Standard of Review?, 34 
MICH. J. INT’L L. 87, 106 (2012) (noting the existence of “nearly three thousand BITs”). 
 66.  Stephan W. Schill, Enhancing International Investment Law’s Legitimacy: Conceptual and 
Methodological Foundations of a New Public Law Approach, 52 VA. J. INT’L L. 57, 63–67 (2011) 
(describing why BITs have proven controversial). 
 67.  Guzman, supra note 50, at 688. 
 68.  See, e.g., Jason Webb Yackee, Do Bilateral Investment Treaties Promote Foreign Direct 
Investment? Some Hints from Alternative Evidence, 51 VA. J. INT’L L. 397 (2010). 
 69.  See, e.g., Eric Neumayer & Laura Spess, Do Bilateral Investment Treaties Increase Foreign 
Direct Investment to Developing Countries?, 33 WORLD DEV. 1567, 1582 (2005). 
 70.  See, e.g., Jeswald W. Salacuse & Nicholas P. Sullivan, Do BITs Really Work?: An Evaluation 
of Bilateral Investment Treaties and Their Grand Bargain, 46 HARV. INT’L L.J. 67, 105 (2005); Jason 
Webb Yackee, Bilateral Investment Treaties, Credible Commitment, and the Rule of (International) 
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for inferring that BITs are viewed by investors as meaningfully reducing 
political risk or that they actually do reduce political risk. 
C. BITs and Off-the-Shelf Indicators of Political Risk 
Of course, designing a convincing empirical test of the thesis that 
BITs reduce political risk is quite difficult.  Even if such a test were to 
show a consistent positive correlation between BITs and FDI flows, this 
would allow only an inference that BITs actually reduce risk.  To show that 
BITs reduce political risk in an objective sense, defining and 
operationalizing political risk as a dependent variable would be necessary.  
But as suggested above, that is challenging. 
One might analyze whether one of the off-the-shelf indicators of 
political risk, like PRI’s ICRG index, correlates well with BITs.  Figure 1 
does just that.  On the horizontal axis are plotted the number of BITs that a 
large number of developing countries had in force with the major capital 
exporting states (United States, UK, France, Germany, and so on) in the 
year 2000.  On the vertical axis are plotted each country’s 2000 ICRG score 
for “investment profile,” the subcategory of risk that, in the ICRG scheme, 
arguably most closely approximates political risk as opposed to broader 
conceptions of “country risk.”  For example, “investment profile” includes 
a sub-component measuring the risk of expropriation.71  For the ICRG 
indicator, a higher score means “less risk,” a lower score means “more 
risk.”72  Only a year of data is presented to simplify the presentation.  
Figure 1 suggests a weak relationship between ICRG “investment profile” 
and the number of BITs in force.  While the trend line slopes upwards and 
to the left (indicating less risk as states have more BITs in force), the slope 
is weak, and the various observations are scattered in a wide band around 
the trend line.  BITs do not appear to be a good predictor of political risk, at 
least as measured by the ICRG. 
But as suggested above, it is not clear that the ICRG risk indexes 
actually measure risk in a conceptually sound way, let alone an empirically 
validated way.  It is also not clear that the risks that the ICRG measures are 
 
Law: Do BITs Promote Foreign Direct Investment?, 42 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 805, 827–28 (2008).  There 
are a number of methodological challenges that afflict empirical studies of the BIT-FDI relationship.  A 
full detailing is beyond the scope of this Article, but at a minimum, it should be appreciated that FDI 
data quality is notoriously poor, especially across time and across developing countries; that FDI data 
does not allow sector-specific tests of BIT effectiveness; and that it does not allow much examination of 
whether BITs increase bilateral (as opposed to aggregate) FDI flows.  On some of the weaknesses of 
FDI data, see JIMMY J. ZHAN, FDI STATISTICS: A CRITICAL REVIEW AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS (2006), 
available at http://www.waipa.org/pdf/SurveyResults/Problems_with_FDI_statistics.pdf. 
 71.  PRS GRP., supra note 36, at 3–4. 
 72.  Id. 
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necessarily actionable under BITs.  Nor is it clear that the best way to 
aggregate BITs as political risk-reducers is by simply adding up the 
treaties.  Perhaps the actual correlation between BITs and political risk 
depends on treaty-specific details, on country-specific variables, or on the 
time period of analysis.  A simple scatterplot cannot test these more 
complicated conjectures.  At the same time, however, Figure 1 does 
suggest that the ICRG risk-rating experts do not obviously give BITs 
particularly great weight in making their risk determinations.73 
D. The Imperfect Coverage of BITs 
As suggested in the previous section, there is a possibility that the 
guarantees contained in international investment law only loosely or 
incompletely address the risks that investors or theorists are likely to lump 
under the concept of political risk.74  For example, it seems reasonable to 
assume that investors concerned about political risk would in part be 
concerned about the risk that their investments would suffer physical harm 
in the event of a civil war or insurgency in the host state.  Off-the-shelf 
indicators of political risk will often include some estimate of the 
probability of political violence, and political risk insurers typically offer 
insurance policies against damage caused by civil war or other forms of 
political violence.75  International investment law does in fact also protect 
against this kind of political risk but only imperfectly.  Most BITs include a 
clause guaranteeing the investor “full protection and security.”76  The exact 
meaning of that guarantee is obscure and contested, but the guarantee 
seems intended, in part, to provide some sort of promise by the host state to 
physically protect the foreign investment (e.g., through the provision of 
 
 73.  Showing that BITs are correlated with off-the-shelf indicators of political risk does not show 
that BITs reduce political risk in an objective sense.  Analyses of the kind illustrated in Figure 1 can 
only shed light on whether the formulators of subjective estimates of risk use the presence or absence of 
BITs when making their evaluations.  In other words, analyses along the lines of Figure 1 have the 
capacity to reveal what the ICRG experts think about BITs and risk, not whether BITs actually reduce 
risk.  Whether the experts’ thoughts are likely to be objectively right depends on how much faith one 
has in their expertise. 
 74.  This is especially a problem where the definition of political risk is quite broad.  See, e.g., 
Butler & Joaquin, supra note 60, at 599 (defining political risk as “the risk that a sovereign host 
government will unexpectedly change the ‘rules of the game’ under which businesses operate”).  
International investment law offers protections against changes in the “rules of the game” only in 
certain circumstances, however: for example, where the change violates a contractual provision or 
where it suffers from some other vice, such as impermissible discrimination. 
 75.  Leon E. Trakman, The ICSID Under Siege, 45 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 603, 655 (2011). 
 76.  Stephen E. Blythe, The Advantages of Investor-State Arbitration as a Dispute Resolution 
Mechanism in Bilateral Investment Treaties, 47 INT’L LAW. 273, 275 (2013). 
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some minimum standard of police or other protective services).77  The 
standard does not seem intended to create strict liability for the host state 
and may only create a duty for the host state to act with “due diligence” to 
protect the investor’s property.78  The guarantee is thus not without any 
useful content (depending on what “due diligence” itself means), but it 
seems significantly less protective than insurance, which will more closely 
reflect a strict liability standard under which the policy is triggered 
regardless of whether the host state acted with diligence. 
E. The High Costs and Uncertainty of BIT Litigation 
Moreover, the aggrieved investor seeking to enforce a right to due 
diligence in the provision of full protection and security (or any other right 
guaranteed under a BIT or customary international law) may have to spend 
considerable time, effort, and money to convince a tribunal to declare the 
guarantee violated79 and further time and effort enforcing the resulting 
judgment.  The high costs of accessing the machinery of international 
justice may limit international investment law’s utility as a political risk-
reducing device for claimants without deep pockets.80  And given that the 
proper meaning and application of many BIT provisions remain unclear,81 
the success of a legal challenge will itself be uncertain.  As a recent study 
shows, investors win only about half of investor-state arbitrations and 
 
 77.  George K. Foster, Recovering “Protection and Security”: The Treaty Standard’s Obscure 
Origins, Forgotten Meaning, and Key Current Significance, 45 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1095, 1097–
98 (2012). 
 78.  Id. at 1109–10. 
 79.  David Gaukrodger & Kathryn Gordon, Investor-State Dispute Settlement: A Scoping Paper 
for the Investment Policy Community 19 (Org. for Econ. Co-operation & Dev. Inv. Dev., OECD 
Working Paper on International Investment No. 2012/03, 2012), available at www.oecd.org/daf/ 
investment/workingpapers (“[L]egal and arbitration costs for the parties in recent ISDS cases have 
averaged over USD 8 million with costs exceeding USD 30 million in some cases.  In the recent 
Abaclat decision (which addresses jurisdiction but not the merits), the tribunal noted that the claimants 
had spent some USD 27 million on their case to date, and that Argentina had spent about USD 12 
million.” (footnote omitted)). 
 80.  Id. at 17 (“Small investors can be [BIT arbitration] claimants. . . .  Far from supporting the 
view that investment arbitration is not an option for smaller investors, the survey shows that 22% of the 
claimants in both ICSID and UNCITRAL cases are either individuals or very small corporations with 
limited foreign operations . . . .”).  These results suggest that the high costs of investment treaty 
arbitration may not pose serious “access to justice” issues.  On the other hand, Gaukrodger & Gordon 
do not examine how successful these claims by small investors actually were.  Given the presumably 
meager legal budgets of such entities, these BIT lawsuits may be quixotic in character. 
 81.  Katselas, supra note 65, at 109 (“Given the relative and recent prominence of investment 
treaty arbitration, the absence of binding precedent, and the fact that tribunals interpret various treaties 
rather than one statute, it is not surprising that the meanings of the treaty standards are not yet 
clear . . . .”). 
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rarely win anything close to their claimed damages.82 
The cost of accessing international investment law and the uncertain 
meaning of international investment law guarantees mean that international 
investment law may not meaningfully reduce modern forms of political 
risk, such as the risk of “regulatory expropriation.”  Governments routinely 
intervene in national and international markets, not necessarily as buyers 
and sellers (though they do that too) but as regulators or even creators of 
those markets,83 necessarily suggesting that government action or inaction 
can have important effects on the profitability of those markets or of 
individual investments.  If the risk of adverse regulatory change is arguably 
the quintessential modern “political risk,” international investment law 
offers relatively meager protections against it.  While BITs routinely offer 
clear guarantees against inadequately compensated classic expropriation, 
the extension of expropriation principles to the case of regulatory 
expropriation is contested,84 and leaders in BIT practice, such as the United 
States, seem to be working to restrict the probability that expropriation 
clauses in BITs will be available to challenge sovereign regulatory 
decisions that are not discriminatory against foreign investors.85 
BITs may also contain important “escape clause” provisions that 
provide host states with excuses and defenses or that exempt certain kinds 
of investment disputes from mandatory arbitration.86  For example, the U.S. 
model BIT contains a number of exceptions designed to enhance the host 
state’s policy space.  Article 18 provides a self-judging “essential security” 
exception that allows the host state to apply otherwise treaty-inconsistent 
 
 82.  See Susan D. Franck, Empirically Evaluating Claims About Investment Treaty Arbitration, 86 
N.C. L. REV. 1, 49–50 (2007). 
 83.  The government’s pervasive regulatory role in modern society is captured in Rubin’s notion 
of the “administrative state.”  See EDWARD L. RUBIN, BEYOND CAMELOT: RETHINKING POLITICS AND 
LAW FOR THE MODERN STATE (2005). 
 84.  For a review of the debate, see generally Rahim Moloo & Justin Jacinto, Environmental and 
Health Regulation: Assessing Liability Under Investment Treaties, 29 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 1 (2011). 
 85.  See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF STATE ET AL., 2012 U.S. MODEL BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATY 
annex B, at 41, available at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/188371.pdf (clarifying that 
expropriation as defined in the treaty is “intended to reflect customary international law” and that non-
discriminatory regulations will only in undefined “rare circumstances” amount to an expropriation); see 
also Joel C. Beauvais, Note, Regulatory Expropriations Under NAFTA: Emerging Principles and 
Lingering Doubts, 10 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 245, 248 (2002) (reviewing regulatory takings cases and 
finding that NAFTA tribunals have approached the doctrine “relatively conservatively, placing 
significant limitations on the scope of government regulation subject to it”); Moloo & Jacinto, supra 
note 84, at 24 (describing the standard in practice for finding a regulatory expropriation). 
 86.  For an overview of these so-called “non-precluded measures” provisions, see generally 
William W. Burke-White & Andreas von Staden, Investment Protection in Extraordinary Times: The 
Interpretation and Application of Non-precluded Measures Provisions in Bilateral Investment Treaties, 
48 VA. J. INT’L L. 307 (2008). 
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measures “that it considers necessary for the fulfillment of its obligations 
with respect to the maintenance or restoration of international peace and 
security, or the protection of its own essential security interests.”87  The 
self-judging nature of the provision means that the host state’s invocation 
and application of an essential security exception will be difficult or 
perhaps impossible for an investor to challenge in arbitration.  Article 20 
provides an exception for prudential measures designed to ensure the 
“integrity and stability of the financial system.”88  Crucially, the investor’s 
right to challenge state decisions taken under this exception is subject to 
numerous important limitations in the article’s text.89  Moreover, the U.S. 
model limits the ability of investors to challenge “taxation measures” as 
treaty-inconsistent.90  The net effect of such carve-outs is to reduce the 
scope of international investment law’s applicability to the investor-state 
relationship, thus reducing its ability to mitigate political risk. 
F. Imagining a World Without BITs 
When judging the potential effectiveness of international law to 
reduce political risk, having a sense of baseline expectations is important.  
When considering BITs as international law, the obvious baseline is a 
world without BITs.  Is that hypothetical world one in which political risk 
is rampant?  In fact, it is probably not.  States would have reputational 
incentives to keep foreign investors happy (at least as long as states desire 
additional investment in the future).  And even where reputational concerns 
were inadequate (perhaps where ideas about the value of FDI were in flux), 
investors would have alternative ways to protect themselves against 
political risk.  Some of those alternatives would entail international 
investment law in a “lite” form.  For example, investment contracts with 
the host state might provide investors with sufficient legal security through 
arbitration and international law choice-of-law clauses.91  Or investors 
might be able to organize their affairs to minimize host state incentives to 
interfere—by, for example, structuring the investment to maintain 
dependence on the parent corporation for intellectual property, technology, 
 
 87.  U.S. DEP’T OF STATE ET AL., supra note 85, art. 18. 
 88.  Id. art. 20. 
 89.  Id. 
 90.  Id. art. 21. 
 91.  Jason Webb Yackee, Do We Really Need BITs? Toward a Return to Contract in International 
Investment Law, 3 ASIAN J. WTO & INT’L HEALTH L. & POL’Y 121, 128–36 (2008) [hereinafter Do We 
Really Need BITs?]; Jason Webb Yackee, Pacta Sunt Servanda and State Promises to Foreign Investors 
Before Bilateral Investment Treaties: Myth & Reality, 32 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1550, 1589 (2009). 
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and management skills.92 
CONCLUDING THOUGHTS 
It is commonplace and even facile to state that low political risk 
makes investment opportunities attractive.  In that view, a principal task for 
infrastructure investors is to assess host state levels of such risk, just as a 
task for host states is to convince investors that the level of political risk is 
in fact low.  But as this Article has demonstrated, the concept of political 
risk is fraught.  Analysts do not agree on how it should be defined, 
operationalized, or measured, and off-the-shelf indicators of it tend to 
consist of grab bags of variables that are only loosely related either to each 
other or to a specified theory of political risk.  Moreover, existing models 
of political risk, even the most sophisticated, seem to defy empirical 
validation, and in any case, many, perhaps most, companies do not make 
serious attempts to assess political risk prior to investing.  Political risk 
does not seem to be a terribly useful way of thinking about what makes an 
infrastructure investment attractive or not. 
Likewise, this Article has demonstrated that while it is easy to assume 
that international investment law, as embodied in BITs, is valuable for 
reducing political risk, in fact BITs probably play, or probably should play, 
only a limited role in reducing investor perceptions of it.  BITs cover only a 
portion of the adverse events that investors may worry about, accessing 
BITs is costly and time consuming, and the outcome of BIT arbitrations is 
uncertain, especially given the vague and ambiguous text of most 
investment treaties.  Moreover, BITs increasingly contain escape clauses, 
like self-judging national security exceptions, that weaken legal protections 
that are already somewhat nebulous.  Unsurprisingly, some research 
suggests that investors do not pay much attention to BITs when deciding 
whether to invest. 
To end on a somewhat more constructive note, what does the analysis 
above suggest that infrastructure investors can or should do when thinking 
about whether to invest in a particular project (or when thinking about how 
to think about whether to invest in a particular project)?  The investor 
should appreciate the conceptual and empirical difficulties involved in 
political risk assessment prior to investing large sums of money to set up a 
sophisticated internal political-risk-assessment operation.  Assuming that 
 
 92.  PAUL E. COMEAUX & N. STEPHAN KINSELLA, PROTECTING FOREIGN INVESTMENT UNDER 
INTERNATIONAL LAW: LEGAL ASPECTS OF POLITICAL RISK 130 (1997) (discussing other risk-mitigation 
strategies, such as arranging project financing through a host state or international organization, 
organizing the project so that the investor holds the host state “hostage,” or obtaining political risk 
insurance). 
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investors should assess political risk is easy, but doing so in a theoretically 
and empirically sound way is a huge task that should not be entered into 
lightly.  Investors should also be aware that political risk assessment “on 
the cheap” (for example, by using off-the-shelf indicators) is not 
necessarily any better (or any worse) than political risk assessment done 
expensively.  Assessment on the cheap can provide the decision-maker 
with a heuristic useful for forcing decisions, but such assessments are not 
really risk assessments in any sort of rigorous way. 
As to investment law, infrastructure investors should be aware of BITs 
as potentially relevant to their risk assessments, but they should also be 
suspicious of claims that BITs are highly effective at reducing risk.  For 
sure, BITs provide infrastructure investors with some legal protections, and 
in some cases infrastructure investors have used the treaties to sue host 
states for international law violations.93  On the other hand, in many cases, 
an infrastructure investor will be better off negotiating with the host state a 
high-quality investment (concession) contract that provides the primary 
legal protection against adverse host state action (or inaction).94 
 
 93.  For example, the International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes’ (ICSID) 
latest case statistics show that eighteen percent of all cases registered under the ICSID Convention or 
the ICSID Additional Facility Rules involve the electric power and water sectors.  ICSID CASELOAD—
STAT. (Int’l Ctr. for Settlement of Inv. Disputes, Washington, D.C.), no. 2013-2, 2013, at 12, available 
at https://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=ICSIDDocRH&actionVal=Show 
Document&CaseLoadStatistics=True&language=English42. 
 94.  COMEAUX & KINSELLA, supra note 92, at 133–49 (providing advice on the drafting of 
investment contracts, which they believe potentially reduce political risk through various mechanisms); 
see also Do We Really Need BITs?, supra note 91, at 121 (arguing for an international investment law 
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